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LIST OF PARTIES 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of 
all parties involved in the case in chiefJ Plaintiff Annette 
Belden1s case against Dalbo, Inc. and Dale Peel was settled prior 
to trial with the knowledge and consent ofl the third-party defen-
dant and his counsel and Annette Beldon i$ not a party to this 
appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The respondents would agree withI the issues presented as 
set forth in appellant's brief and would take issue only with the 
statement in paragraph 3 regarding whether the court abused its 
discretion in allowing testimony regarding the extra-marital 
affair to go before the jury. Such language appears nowhere in 
the trial transcript and respondent would!restate this merely as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing 
testimony of the relationship between Annette Beldon and Martin 
L. Lingwall. 
Another issue presented here, although by appellant's 
brief rather than the appeal in general, is whether the affida-
vits of the jurors in the trial court may be properly considered 
by this court in determining the issues presented by this appeal. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ANNETTE ELLERTSEN BELDEN, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents find the appellant's 
to be substantially correct and adequate 
appeal. 
statement of the case 
[for purposes of this 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^ 
I. 
The appellant has improperly inc luded affidavits of 
jurors and former counsel in his appellant brief. Evidence is 
not admissible on appeal if not presented 
the law is clear that, absent evidence of 
by chance, jurors may not impeach their own verdict. The affida-
to the trial court and 
misconduct or verdict 
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vits included in the appellant's brief as Appendix A-1 through 
A-3 are incompetent for the purposes of impeaching the jury ver-
dict and are improperly included in appellant's brief. The affi-
davit of counsel included as Appendix A-4 should more properly 
have been made a part of the record during the motion for new 
trial and should not be considered as part of appellant's brief. 
II. 
The case of Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), 
was decided approximately one month after the jury returned a 
verdict in the present case and should, therefore, have no appli-
cation to the present case. 
III. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Dixon v. Stewart, 
supra, decision would apply to the present case, this case pre-
sents the situation described in that decision as an exception to 
the requirement that the jury be instructed regarding the effects 
of its finding of comparative negligence. This case involved an 
initial complaint against the defendants by the passenger on the 
motorcycle against the driver of the truck involved, a third-
party complaint by that driver against the driver of the motor-
cycle and also involved issues relating to the application of the 
Utah guest statute, which has since been found unconstitutional. 
The issues involved were complex and instructions relating to the 
effects of a finding of comparative negligence would necessarily 
have brought evidence before the jury of the settlement between 
-2-
plaintiff, Annette Belden, and defendant Dalbo and Dale Peel and 
would have been prejudicial to those defendants. Despite 
appellant's contention, there is no indication in the record that 
a refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the 
effects of its finding of comparative negligence lead to any 
error whatsoever. The damages found by tne jury as reported in 
its special verdict do bear a significant relationship to the 
evidence, or lack thereof, and were not inadequate, as a matter 
of law. 
The decision by the trial court jiot to instruct the jury 
on the effects of its finding of comparative negligence was, 
therefore, correct even under the guidelines of Dixon v. Stewart, 
supra. 
IV. 
Evidence of the relationship bet 
Annette Belden was relevant to the issues 
the appellant at the time the accident oc 
jtfeen Martin Lingwall and 
of the state of mind of 
burred and did not 
create any prejudice to the appellant. The very brief discussion 
of the relationship is found in the trans 
covered approximately three days and ental 
several witnesses. There was no discussion of any extra-marital 
sexual activity between the appellant and 
testimony concerning the relationship was 
and created no prejudice to the appellant 
cript of the trial which 
iled testimony by 
Annette Belden. The 
relevant to the case 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INCLUSION OF JUROR AFFIDAVITS IN 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS IMPROPER AND THE 
AFFIDAVITS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY 
THIS COURT ON APPEAL. 
Aside from the general principle that issues and evi-
dence not presented to the trial court will not be considered on 
appeal, the appellant's attempt to include jurors' affidavits 
impeaching the jury verdict in its appellate brief flies in the 
face of several clear decisions of this court holding that 
jurors, by affidavit, may not impeach their own verdict, absent 
evidence that the verdict was determined by chance or bribery. 
The most recent decision supporting this principle is Rosenlof v. 
Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983). That case involved a claim 
of misrepresentation against a vendor of real property and a 
third-party complaint against the real estate agent who had 
arranged the sale. During deliberations, the jury transmitted a 
question to the trial judge regarding division of liability be-
tween the defendants in the case. After consulting counsel, the 
court formulated a response which, among other things, suggested 
a rereading of the jury instructions and verdict forms. The jury 
returned a verdict which contained a mathematical error. On 
motion for a new trial, counsel for the defendant presented an 
affidavit of the jury foreman relating to the error. The court, 
quoting Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 428-429, 250 
P.2d 932, 937 (1952) , stated: 
To permit litigants to get jurors to 
sign affidavits or testify to matters 
-4-
discussed in connection with their func-
tions as jurors would open che door to 
inquiry into all manner of things which a 
losing litigant might consider improper: 
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers 
of settlement, personal experiences, pre-
judice against litigants or their causes 
or the classes to which they belong. It 
would be an interminable and totally 
impracticable process. Such post-mortems 
would be productive of no end of mischief 
and render service as a juror unbearable. 
If jurors were so circumscribed in their 
deliberations, it is likely that judge and 
counsel would have to be present in the 
jury room attempting to monitor and regu-
late their thought and discussions into 
approved channels. Fortunately, jurors 
are under no such limitations, but are 
allowed freedom in their deliberations. 
See also, Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 5^ 8 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); and Johnsdm v. Simons, 551 P.2d 
515 (Utah 1976). 
The clear weight of authority indicates that appellant's 
attempt to admit juror affidavits to impeach the verdict is 
clearly improper and these affidavits should not be considered by 
the court in determining the issues on appeal. 
The attempt by appellant's counsel 
vit of Stephen L. Henriod is improper not 
attempts to admit evidence on appeal whicl^  
been included in the record on motion for 
should be stricken insofar as it is not b^sed on personal 
knowledge. Paragraph 3 of that affidavit (alleges that during its 
deliberations the jury became confused regarding the effect their 
finding of comparative negligence would have on the parties. 
Although the jury may, indeed, have requested additional instruc-
1 to admit the affida-
only in that it 
should more properly 
a new trial, but also 
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tions, the reasons for so requesting the instructions are within 
the peculiar knowledge of the jurors, and it is speculation on 
the part of Mr. Henriod as to the reason for the request. 
Counsel for appellant is well aware that such affidavits 
are incompetent. He attempted to get a stipulation that they 
could be added to the record but for obvious reasons the stipula-
tion was refused. The attempt to insert them into the record as 
exhibits to appellant's brief is an attempt to improperly 
influence the court and should be rejected. Counsel for 
appellant should be censured for such conduct. 
II. 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN DIXON v. STEWART 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO THE 
PRESENT CASE. 
This court has, on a number of occasions, held that 
decisions of the court will normally be granted retroactive 
application and that such application is not prohibited or 
required by constitutional law. Malan v. Lewis (decision on 
rehearing), P.2d (Utah 1984); Royal Order of Moose v. 
County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). The 
court may, however, in its discretion, prohibit retroactive 
operation where the "overruled law has been justifiably relied 
upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden.ff Royal 
Order of Moose v. County Board of Equalisation, 657 P.2d at 265; 
Malan v. Lewis, supra. Malan v. Lewis, supra, decided by this 
court on December 14, 1984, determined that retroactive applica-
tion of the guest statute was not prohibited either by constitu-
-6-
tional law or by justifiable reliance or 4ndue burden. The court 
reached this decision after finding that a showing of justifiable 
reliance or undue burden had not been mad^ out by the respon-
dents. 
The State of Kansas adopted a rule similar to that in 
Dixon v. Stewart, supra, in Thomas v. Boajrd of Trustees of Salem 
Township, 582 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1978). Subsequently, the Kansas 
Court of Appeals was faced with the very question here in the 
remarkably similar case of Cook v. Doty, 608 P.2d 1028 (Kan.App. 
1980). In that case, the jury returned a verdict finding 80% 
negligence on the plaintiff and 20% negligence on the defendant. 
The Thomas case, determining that an instruction regarding the 
effects of application of comparative negligence should be given 
to the jury, was decided approximately two months after the Cook 
case was tried. Plaintiff argued that the decision should have 
retroactive application and that he had been prejudiced by the 
failure of the court to give such an instruction. The court 
discussed the options available in applying a decision and cited 
Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262 (Kan. 1974), in listing five 
recognized factors commonly relied upon by courts in determining 
the retroactivity question: 
"
 f(1) Justifiable reliance! on the earlier 
law; (2) The nature and purpose of the 
overruling decision; (3) Res judicata; (4) 
Vested rights, if any, whicji may have 
accrued by reason of the earlier law; and 
(5) The effect retroactive application may 
have on the administration of justice in 
the courts. 214 Kan. atl 464. 521 P.2d at 
269. 608 P.2d at 1030. 
-7-
In discussing the application of these factors, the 
court stated: 
In applying the five factors of Vaughn v. 
Murray to the case at bar, it appears to 
us that (1) the court reasonably relied on 
earlier law clearly indicating that the 
jury should not be informed of the legal 
effect of its special verdict. (2) The 
purpose of the Thomas decision was to make 
a new policy determination as to the 
appropriate rule to be followed in the 
instructing of Kansas Juries in com-
parative negligence cases. It concluded 
that the PIK approach was the "better 
rule,11 . . . (3) Prospective application 
would leave intact judgments entered prior 
to the announcement of the Thomas deci-
sion, promoting the doctrine of res judi-
cata. (4) There are no vested rights 
which have accrued under the earlier law. 
The court, in discussing the effect that retroactive 
application would have on the administration of justice, cited a 
discussion in its decision overruling the Kansas guest statute, 
Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974), where the court gave 
only prospective application to its overruling of the guest 
statute. The court then went on to state: 
The result in Vaughn was that the Henry 
decision was given limited retroactive 
effect -- it applied to all similar cases 
pending when the opinion was filed and 
cases filed thereafter regardless of when 
the causes of action accrued, but it did 
not apply where a judgment or verdict had 
been entered prior to that decision and 
the same was free of reversible error 
under the law then existing. 
In continuing its discussion of these policy con-
siderations, the court stated: 
A somewhat similar result would appear to 
be appropriate in the instant case, based 
-8-
on the policy considerations! recognized in 
Vaughn. The Thomas decision can be given 
application to all similar cases pending 
and untried when it was decided on July 
21, 1978, and all cases filed thereafter 
regardless of when the causes of action 
accrued. However, in cases where a 
judgment or verdict has beeni entered in a 
district court prior to July 21, 1978, and 
it is otherwise free of reversible error, 
we hold that the judgment should stand 
regardless of whether the PIK instruction 
issue was raised at trial. jWe make this 
distinction from the Vaughn tesult 
because, unlike the guest statute revi-
sion, Thomas does not affectj a substantive 
right of the parties. Instekd, it repre-
sents only a choice of procedure on the 
basis of desirability, over which there is 
room for a substantial difference of opi-
nion. The trial court's decision here 
cannot be said to be error, and even if it 
were, it did not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
A similar decision should be reached in the present 
case. The accident which formed the basis of this action 
occurred on September 5, 1981, well over three years ago. Trial 
was held commencing November 30, 1982, over two years ago. The 
trial lasted three days, 17 separate witnesses were called and 
nearly 150 exhibits were introduced at trial, which have been 
subsequently released to respective counsel. The trial court 
reasonably relied upon the then current state of the law, as set 
forth in McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1974), in instructing the jury. The McGinn decision was reason-
ably relied upon by the court and an undue burden would result if 
a new trial were ordered. All of the policy considerations 
discussed in Cook v. Doty, supra, are applicable to the present 
case and the court should rule that the Dixon decision does not 
-9-
apply to the present case. 
III. 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE DIXON 
DECISION APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE, THIS 
CASE FITS SQUARELY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO 
THAT RULING WHERE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION 
WOULD LEAD TO CONFUSION AND PREJUDICE TO 
THE PARTIES. 
A finding that the Dixon decision is applicable to this 
case does not require a reversal and remand for new trial. The 
record indicates that the trial court had before it the Dixon 
decision and, despite appellant's argument for its application in 
the present case, determined that a new trial was not 
appropriate. The court made its decision in a minute entry which 
did not specifically discuss the reasoning behind the ruling. 
The court did, however, consider memoranda and argument of coun-
sel for appellant and respondents and had before it the decision 
of this court in Dixon v. Stewart, supra. In his motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a 
new trial, appellant listed four grounds for his motion: 
1. Said verdict is contrary to law. 
2. Said verdict is contrary to the 
evidence. 
3. Inadequate damages were given. 
4. Error in law occurred at the 
trial. 
Appellant's statement of issues presented on appeal, 
however, seems to indicate that he is limiting his appeal to 
errors in law, and he appears to be relying on the inadequacy of 
-10-
damages as indicating confusion on the paijt of the jury. 
In reviewing a trial court's rulings pertaining to 
motions for a directed verdict, judgment n 
new trial, the Appellate Court grants cons 
the trial court decision and reviews the r 
whether there is any evidentiary basis whatsoever for the jury's 
decision. If such a basis exists, then the trial court must be 
affirmed. All reasonable inferences which 
of the order are also considered. McClouq 
(Utah 1977). Although the trial court did 
reasons for denying the motion for a new t 
that it did have the Dixon v. Stewart deci 
sideration and this court may presume that it correctly applied 
that decision, finding that this case pres< 
of complicated and confusing situation whi< 
to give an instruction on the effects of aj finding of comparative 
negligence. 
.o.v. or motion for a 
iderable deference to 
ecord to determine 
may be drawn as part 
v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 
not enunciate its 
rial, the record shows 
sion before it for eon-
ented exactly the type 
ch warranted a refusal 
This case was originally brought |by Annette Belden 
against Dalbo, Inc. and Dale Peel for injuries received in the 
accident and the defendants filed a third-
the appellant claiming contribution. The 
counterclaim for his damages. Prior to trl 
case was settled for $285,000, which settl 
the court and by the appellant and his counsel. A concern of 
instructing the jury regarding their appor 
was that it would necessarily require the 
party complaint against 
(appellant then filed a 
ial, the plaintiff's 
ement was approved by 
Itionment of negligence 
court to inform the 
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jury that the respondent was claiming contribution against the 
appellant for a portion of the $285,000 settlement. An addi-
tional issue presented at the time of trial, which a subsequent 
decision of this court has rendered moot, was whether the road 
upon which this accident occurred was a private road or a public 
road for purposes of applying the Utah guest statute. 
Instructing the jury regarding the effects of their finding of 
comparative negligence would have required evidence of the 
settlement between plaintiff, Annette Belden, and defendants 
which would, certainly, have further confused the jury with 
regard to the effects of their finding and which would most cer-
tainly have prejudiced the defendants. Evidence of the settle-
ment could lead the jury to believe that the settlement was an 
admission of liability, despite specific Utah statutory authority 
otherwise. 
To properly advise the jury of the results of its deli-
berations would also have required the court to give instructions 
to the jury regarding the then valid Utah guest statute and the 
effects of their findings on whether the road on which the acci-
dent occurred was a private road or a public road. This would 
have placed a number of legal issues before the jury which are 
more properly decided by the court and would have created suf-
ficient confusion to prevent the jury from properly deciding the 
issues appropriately before them. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in ruling that a jury should be 
made aware of the effects of its findings of comparative negli-
-12-
gence, also recognized this exception in $eppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 
683 (Idaho 1978). In setting out this exception, the court 
stated: 
. . . Though we believe in iiiost cases such 
an instruction is fully warranted, we 
conclude that the trial courts should be 
given discretion not to so inform the jury 
in those cases where the issues are so 
complex or the legal isuses so uncertain 
that such instructions woul<fl confuse or 
mislead the jury. 
Appellant has argued that the amounts of damages awarded 
by the jury are so inadequate as to indicate that the jury 
reduced the amount of damages to what it felt the plaintiff 
should recover and was thereby confused by the failure of the 
trial court to grant instructions regarding the effects of com-
parative negligence. The jury awarded the full amount of plain-
tiff's medical expenses and lost income damages in the amount of 
$28,000. Lost future income was found to 
damages were found to be $5,000. Although the general damages 
may appear to be low, they are certainly within the prerogative 
of the jury. Since medical damages were not compromised and lost 
earnings, both present and future, were well within the testimony 
of plaintiff's expert, there is no evidence of compromise on 
those damages. Thus, it does not appear that the jury was con-
fused or compromised general damages. 
The situation present in Dixon simply does not apply 
here. The jury's finding of negligence was 70% on the plaintiff 
and 30% on the defendant. There was no indication of a contrary 
finding later changed by the jury, as in Mxon, nor was there a 
be $20,000 and general 
-13-
50/50 finding of negligence with which the court was concerned in 
Seppi v, Betty, supra. 
Appellant apparently feels that the court could have 
informed the jury of the effects of its finding of comparative 
negligence without informing them of the out-of-court settlement 
between Annette Belden and the defendants. It is difficult to 
see how this could be done since the first claim brought between 
appellant and respondents was respondents1 third-party complaint 
for contribution. To be fair to both the appellant and respon-
dents, the court would have to instruct the jury that a finding 
of 50% or more negligence on Dalbo would reduce considerably 
defendant's contribution claim. To inform them of this, however, 
would clearly have prejudiced the defendant by admitting evidence 
of that settlement. It is clear that the trial court was correct 
in denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial and 
that the present case fits squarely within the exception of the 
Dixon v. Stewart rule. 
IV. 
EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S RELATIONSHIP 
WITH ANNETTE BELDEN WAS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES BEING DECIDED AND WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT. 
The appellant has cited as a claim of error the 
admission into evidence on cross-examination of the plaintiff's 
testimony regarding the fact that the plaintiff was on a hunting 
trip with a woman, not his wife, although he was married. In 
various portions of his brief, the appellant mentions that evi-
-14-
dence of the extra-marital affair was prejudicial to him. A 
review of the testimony cited in appellant's brief, however, 
shows that there was never any imputation of any kind of sexual 
activity between the plaintiff-appellant knd Annette Belden. 
Plaintiff-appellant was merely asked whether he was concerned 
about his wife finding out about the trip. Sleeping arrangement* 
and any sexual contact between plaintiff-appellant and Annette 
Belden was specifically not discussed on cross-examination. The 
evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff was not looking 
forward a sufficient distance in front of him while operating his 
motorcycle and this cross-examination attempted to determine if 
he had other things on his mind that detracted him from the 
operation of the motorcycle. 
The appellant also improperly characterizes the jury as 
being overwhelmingly Mormon. In addition 
does not appear from the record, it improperly ascribes prejudice 
and bias to all members of a religious group and is clearly not 
supported by any evidence whatsoever. 
to the fact that this 
It is a well-recognized principld 
of evidence is for the trial court to determine and the trial 
court's decision will be given great defer 
abuse of discretion. Terry v. Zion's Coop 
ence, absent a clear 
erative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). The trial court 
apparently felt that the plaintiff's state 
the accident was relevant to the issues of 
evidence of the plaintiff's marriage at thb time he was spending 
that the admissibiliy 
of mind at the time of 
this case and that 
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time with Annette Belden could sufficiently impact on his state 
of mind as to be a contributing cause of the accident. There 
simply was no evidence of any extra-marital affair or sexual con-
tact between the plaintiff and Annette Belden and no attempt was 
made to introduce such evidence. There was no abuse of discre-
tion in the admission of this evidence and no basis exists for an 
overruling of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The affidavits submitted as part of appellant's brief 
are improper and should be stricken from the brief. 
Under general rules of retroactive application of deci-
sions, the Dixon v. Stewart case should be given only limited 
retroactive effect and should not apply to the present case. 
Even if Dixon v. Stewart is applied to the present case, 
it is clear that the complicated relationships between the par-
ties and their various claims among one another as well as the 
numerous legal issues to be determined in the case clearly place 
the present case in the exception to the Dixon v. Stewart rule 
which allows the court to refuse to instruct the jury on the 
effects of their finding of comparative negligence in a par-
ticularly complicated or confusing case. 
No evidence was admitted of any type of extra-marital 
affair or sexual relationship between the plaintiff and Annette 
Belden and that evidence which was admitted was clearly relevant 
to the plaintiff's state of mind and was not prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. There was no error on the part of the trial court and 
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the judgment based on the jury verdict sh<buld be upheld, 
Dated this day of | , 1985. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By_ 
Henry El Heath 
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